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Democracy as Justification for
Waging War: The Role of Public Support
Juan M. Falomir-Pichastor1, Christian Staerkle´2,
Andrea Pereira1, and Fabrizio Butera2
Abstract
Democracy is positively valued. This positive evaluation extends to a democracy’s actions, even if it is to wage war. The authors
investigated whether the perceived legitimacy of military interventions depends on the political structure (democratic vs.
nondemocratic) of the countries involved and on the aggressor country’s popular support for the government’s aggressive
policy. Participants learned that an alleged country planned to attack another. The political structure of both countries was
manipulated in the two experiments. The support of the aggressor’s population toward military intervention was measured in
Experiment 1 and manipulated in Experiment 2. Both experiments confirmed that military intervention was perceived as being
less illegitimate when the population supported their democratic government’s policy to attack a nondemocratic country.
Keywords
democracy, perceived legitimacy, military intervention, public opinion
Democracy is good! Few ideas seem to have achieved such a
consensus. For example, between 1980 and 1990, 81 countries
took significant steps toward democracy, with the result that
140 of the world’s nearly 200 countries hold multiparty elec-
tions (United Nations, 2002). Authoritarian regimes even seek
to justify their illegitimate exercise of power and misdeeds by
paradoxically appealing to democratic principles and thereby
claiming actions in the name of the common good. Even criti-
cisms of democracy generally focus on the actual system itself
as compared to what a democracy should actually be, thereby
implicitly confirming the compelling nature of democracy.
Accordingly, several scholars believe in the undeniable histor-
ical victory of democracy and consequently the idea of democ-
racy as nonnegotiable in today’s world (e.g., Dunn, 2005;
Fukuyama, 1992; Shapiro, 2003).
Yet, as democracy has become a seemingly universal
value (Sen, 1999; Shapiro & Hacker-Cordon, 1999), it
may also constitute a legitimizing ideology that provides
justification to even immoral and ‘‘un-democratic’’ means.
History has shown that many political and religious ideolo-
gies have served to justify questionable belligerent attitudes;
the question posed here is whether democracy may be one
of them. The aim of the present research was to study democ-
racy’s righteousness by investigating whether the perceived
legitimacy of intended military interventions depends
upon the political structure (democratic vs. nondemocratic)
of the countries in conflict, and whether this effect is mod-
erated by the perceived support of the aggressor country’s
public opinion.
The Democracy-as-Value Hypothesis
The ‘‘Democracy-as-value’’ hypothesis contends that democ-
racy is an ideological belief system that provides value to dem-
ocratic individuals, groups, and institutions, therefore granting
legitimacy to their actions, whatever that action may actually
be (Falomir, Staerkle´, Depuiset, & Butera, 2005, 2007). It is
important to note that democracy as a social and political value
is not to be confounded with democracy as a governmental sys-
tem (e.g., Dunn, 2005; Sen, 1999). Indeed, from a social psy-
chological point of view, democracy functions as a unit of
interpretation, providing information concerning ideals, goals,
expectations, and valued actions as to how groups and societies
should function, as other ideologies do (e.g., Jost & Banaji,
1994; Lerner, 1977; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Weber, 1958).
Of course, the legitimizing value attributed to democracy
should occur more likely among citizens of democratic coun-
tries, even if the spread of democracy as a universal value
would suggest that it may not necessarily be restricted to them
(e.g., Sen, 1999). When a group is known to be democratic, as
compared to nondemocratic ones, people infer specific
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characteristics of the group and its members that are associated
with well-known democratic principles (e.g., equality, free-
dom, autonomy, popular sovereignty, collective decisions,
representative leaders, separation of powers, preference for
peaceful solutions to conflicts, tolerance of dissent and voice,
and respect for the common good). Even more importantly,
people also believe that these groups and their characteristics
are intrinsically good, legitimate, and desirable. Conse-
quently, actions emanating from democratic groups should
be perceived as more legitimate than the same actions carried
out by less democratic ones.
What is the rationale for democracy’s value? Research in
social psychology shows that democracy is perceived by
individuals living in democratic countries as the best possible
political system, referring to the (only) right way that national
groups should be organized and take political decisions
(Staerkle´, 2005; Staerkle´, Cle´mence, & Doise, 1998; see also
Magioglou, 2008). Furthermore, members of democratic soci-
eties are perceived more positively than members of nondemo-
cratic societies (Staerkle´ et al., 1998). Research on procedural
justice has shown that egalitarian and democratic decision-
making procedures (i.e., based on the right to voice opinions)
make final decisions appear fairer than those obtained through
authoritarian and nondemocratic procedures (Folger, 1977;
see also Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind,
1992). Many studies have also shown that individuals strongly
support concepts and ideals that are historically associated
with democracy such as human rights, peace, and prosperity
(e.g., Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Doise,
Spini, & Cle´mence, 1999) or freedom and individual auton-
omy (e.g. Beauvois, 2005; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; Sampson,
1988; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). Finally,
experimental support comes from research by Falomir,
Staerkle´, Depuiset, and Butera (2005), showing that aggres-
sions perpetrated by members of democratic groups were
perceived as less illegitimate than aggressions perpetrated
by members of nondemocratic groups, especially when the
victims belonged to nondemocratic groups.
In sum, these considerations suggest that in Western societ-
ies at least democracy is recognized as a value, and therefore
military interventions may be perceived as more legitimate
when perpetrated by democratic countries especially against
nondemocratic ones. Historical evidence in support of this
hypothesis comes from the fact that recent military interven-
tions by democratic countries against nondemocratic countries
have been justified by the spread of democracy around the
world (Geis, Brock, & Mu¨ller, 2006; Ish-Shalom, 2007; Meier-
henrich, 2007; see also Henry, 2008). Empirical evidence
comes from studies experimentally examining the effect of
political regimes on attitudes toward war (Healy, Hoffman,
Beer, & Bourne, 2002; Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999;
Mintz & Geva, 1993; see also Mann & Gaertner, 1991; Liu
et al., 2009; Pratto, Glasford, & Hegarty, 2006). Overall, results
showed that U.S. participants supported the use of force by
their government to a greater extent within a hypothetical con-
flict when the fictional antagonistic country was described as
nondemocratic as opposed to democratic (Mintz & Geva,
1993; Geva & Hanson, 1999; see also Healy et al., 2002), and
when the victim of the fictional antagonistic country was dem-
ocratic rather than nondemocratic (Herrmann et al., 1999;
Experiment 2).
Overall, these findings suggest that violence is considered
more justifiable when the aggressor country is democratic and
the victim country is nondemocratic. However, several aspects
of the paradigms used in the above research preclude an inter-
pretation in terms of our democracy-as-value hypothesis. First,
the existence of utilitarian motivations cannot be excluded,
given that participants were asked to decide about their own
government’s engagement in scenarios involving their nation’s
interests. Second, the fact that participants knew the countries
involved makes it difficult to disentangle the effect of the polit-
ical regime and the existence of implicit peace treaties, alli-
ances, and similarities between the participants’ own country
and the other democratic countries. Third, the lack of a control
makes it impossible to adequately test the democracy-as-value
hypothesis: this requires knowing whether there is an increase
in support for democratic military interventions against nonde-
mocratic states.
The goal of the present research was to provide a clear-cut,
empirical test of the democracy-as-value hypothesis with
respect to the perceived legitimacy of military intervention.
In order to achieve this, we adopted a third-party perspective
in which participants evaluated military interventions between
two allegedly existent, albeit unknown, countries. We reasoned
that responses from uninvolved participants could not be driven
by instrumental motives such as favoritism for their own or
allied countries, as might have been the case in prior research.
Instead, we want to show that people appeal to the concept of
democracy in order to justify military action that is inconse-
quential to them. A third-party perspective is therefore the only
way to examine the impact of democracy-as-value indepen-
dently of other concerns that inevitably appear when one’s own
country is involved.
Democratic Legitimacy and Popular Support
A second way to provide a critical test of the democracy-
as-value hypothesis is by linking the perceived legitimacy of
democratic countries’ controversial actions, such as waging
war, to the necessary condition of receiving support from the
national population. Indeed, democratic legitimacy is founded
upon the tacit consent of public opinion (e.g., Dunn, 2005;
Glasser & Salmon, 1995; Shapiro, 2003). Thus, popular sup-
port may constitute a proof of the legitimacy of governments’
policies and actions, specifically in democratic countries.
Accordingly, we suggest that public support may play a key
role in the perception of legitimacy of policies and actions as
a moderator of the effect of political government.
Social psychological research has traditionally shown that
public opinion constitutes social proof of validity that influ-
ences observers’ perceptions and attitudes (Deutsch & Gerard,
1955; Festinger, 1954; Kelley, 1952; see also Kruglanski &
Falomir-Pichastor et al. 325
 at Universite de Geneve on April 4, 2012spp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Mayseless, 1987). Furthermore, public opinion not only
appears to have a significant impact on governmental policies
in general (e.g. Brooks &Manza, 2007; Burstein, 2003; Page &
Shapiro, 1983) but also influences governments’ decisions to
initiate war (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, &
Smith, 1999; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Morgan & Campbell,
1991; Reiter & Stam, 2002) as well as the means engaged and
the duration of the conflict (e.g., Allen, 2007). Leaders appear
also to scrutinize public opinion within foreign countries in
order to gauge the credibility of their governments and policies
(Brandt, Colaresi, & Freeman, 2008). Consequently, it seems
reasonable to expect that public opinion may provide third-
party observers with the relevant information about the legiti-
macy of foreign governments’ belligerent actions.
According to the democracy-as-value hypothesis, however,
democratic and nondemocratic public opinions would differ in
the extent to which they provide legitimacy for their govern-
ments’ policies and actions.When compared to nondemocracies,
first, the internal legitimacy of democracies is intrinsically
linked to the population’s consent, and therefore governmen-
tal policies depend upon citizen’s consenting opinions. Sec-
ond, given that leaders in democratic regimes are more
accountable, public opinion is unlikely to be ignored and con-
sequently becomes more diagnostic of the legitimacy of a
given policy. Third, democratic populations are perceived
as being freer and more independent from the government and
are therefore less easily manipulated by them (Staerkle´ et al.,
1998). Finally, democracies are expected, even if mistakenly
(e.g., Reiter & Stam, 2002), to make use of military force only
as a last resort. Accordingly, the overall perceived illegiti-
macy of violent foreign policies such as military interventions
may decrease when they are supported by democratic rather
than nondemocratic public opinion.
Overview and Hypothesis
Participants were informed about a conflict between two
allegedly real countries, previously unknown to them, with
no geographical or political relationship with their own coun-
try. The political structure of both countries was experimen-
tally manipulated in the two studies, and a control condition
was introduced in Experiment 1. The support of the aggressor’s
population toward military intervention was either measured
(Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiment 2). We predicted
a three-way interaction between these factors: Military inter-
ventions should be perceived as less illegitimate when perpe-
trated by democratic countries against nondemocratic ones
(as compared to the other conditions) and particularly when the
population of the democratic aggressor country supports rather
than opposes military action.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants and Design. Participants were 215 Swiss students
from various faculties (95 women, 119 men, 1 missing value;
Mage ¼ 24.57, SD ¼ 8.13) who were retained for the study as
they declared to know little or nothing about this alleged but
inexistent conflict and believed the described risk of military
escalation. They were randomly assigned to one of the five
experimental conditions following a 2 (Victim Country: demo-
cratic, nondemocratic)  2 (Aggressor Country: democratic,
nondemocratic) experimental design (N ¼ 175), with a control
condition (N ¼ 40).
Political Structure of the Countries. Participants were told
that two (allegedly real but actually fictitious) former Soviet
republics were in conflict with the likelihood of serious mili-
tary escalation. Allegedly, under the influence of the Soviet
Union (USSR), one of these countries (Bachran) was annexed
by the other country (Abazie). However, Bachran had asked for
and obtained a de facto autonomy after the collapse of the USSR
which was not acknowledged by Abazie. More recently, the
Abazie government had announced its intention to reintegrate
the Bachran territory through military intervention. Participants
were provided with a short description of both of the countries in
conflict, depicting Abazie (i.e., the aggressor) and Bachran (i.e.,
the victim) as historically either democratic or nondemocratic. In
the control condition, no information was provided about the
political structure of any of the two countries.
Perceived Popular Support for the Military Intervention. Partici-
pants were then asked to indicate to what extent the population
of Abazie (i.e., the aggressor) supported the military interven-
tion proclaimed by their government (0¼ not at all; 10¼ abso-
lutely; M ¼ 4.53, SD ¼ 2.99). Two participants did not answer
this question and were therefore not considered in the analyses.
Given that perceived support was necessarily measured after
the description of the conflict, a precautionary analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA) was run to examine whether the countries’
political structure influenced any perceived support. Results
showed that perceived support (M ¼ 4.47, SD ¼ 2.95) did not
vary as a function of the aggressor and victim main effects,
F(1, 169) ¼ 0.16, p ¼ .90, F(1, 169) ¼ 0.39, p ¼ .53, or the
interaction effect, F(1, 169) ¼ 0.22, p ¼ .64. Furthermore, t
test comparisons with the control condition showed that the
perception of popular support in this condition (M ¼ 4.80,
SD ¼ 3.22) did not differ from that of the remaining experi-
mental conditions, t(208) < 0.90, p > .36. Given that perceived
popular support was shown to be independent of the coun-
tries’ political structure, we used it as a third, continuous,
independent variable.
Perceived Legitimacy of Military Intervention. Five items
assessed the perceived legitimacy of military intervention.
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the
intended military intervention of Abazie against Bachran was
comprehensible, justified, legitimate, desirable, and a good
solution (0 ¼ not at all; 10 ¼ absolutely; a ¼ .86; M ¼ 1.32,
SD ¼ 1.55).
Manipulation checks. Two items assessed the extent to which
each country was democratic or nondemocratic (0 ¼ nondemo-
cratic and 10 ¼ democratic) and egalitarian or authoritarian
326 Social Psychological and Personality Science 3(3)
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(0 ¼ egalitarian and 10 ¼ authoritarian). An average score
was computed after reversing the scores for the second item,
Maggressor ¼ 3.29, SD ¼ 2.04, and Mvictim ¼ 5.19, SD ¼ 2.14,
r(214) ¼ .38, p < .001; r(214) ¼ .31, p < .001.
Results
The main analyses were performed using a 2 (Victim Country:
democratic, nondemocratic)  2 (Aggressor Country: demo-
cratic, nondemocratic)  Perceived Popular Support (standar-
dized scores) design. Specific contrasts were planned in order
to compare the relevant conditions with the control condition.
Preliminary analyses have shown no main or interaction
effects of sex with the independent variables. Sex was there-
fore dropped from the analyses.
Manipulation Checks
The aggressor country was overall perceived as less democratic
than the victim country, t(214) ¼ 8.46, p < .0001, suggesting
that democracy is more associated with peaceful solutions.
The aggressor country was perceived as more democratic in
the democratic condition (M ¼ 4.27, SD ¼ 1.78) than in the
nondemocratic condition (M ¼ 2.35, SD ¼ 1.90), F(1, 165)
¼ 46.35, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .21. Additionally, the above two
conditions significantly differed from the control condition
(M ¼ 3.15, SD ¼ 1.96), t(210) ¼ 3.10, p ¼ .002, and t(210)
¼ 2.23, p ¼ .027, respectively, confirming the effectiveness
of this manipulation.
Moreover, the victim country was perceived as more demo-
cratic in the democratic condition (M ¼ 6.48, SD ¼ 1.63) than
in the nondemocratic condition (M ¼ 3.70, SD ¼ 1.97),
F(1, 165) ¼ 109.07, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .39. Both conditions
differed significantly from the control condition (M ¼ 5.26,
SD ¼ 1.54), t(210) ¼ 4.58, p < .001, and t(210) ¼ 3.62,
p < .001, respectively, again confirming the effectiveness of
this manipulation.
Perceived Legitimacy of Military Intervention
There was a significant main effect of the aggressor
country’s political structure, F(1, 165) ¼ 4.62, p ¼ .033, Zp2
¼ .02, a significant main effect of perceived popular support,
F(1, 165) ¼ 11.46, p ¼ .001, Zp2 ¼ .06, and a significant
aggressor country’s political structure by perceived popular
support interaction, F(1, 165) ¼ 6.05, p ¼ .015, Zp2 ¼
.03. All these effects were qualified by the predicted 3-way
interaction, F(1, 165) ¼ 7.50, p ¼ .007, Zp2 ¼ .04 (cf. Fig-
ure 1).1 In line with our hypothesis, perceived legitimacy was
highest for high conditional levels of perceived popular sup-
port in the democratic aggressor/nondemocratic victim con-
dition (M ¼ 3.11); this condition was higher than the
corresponding control condition (M ¼ 1.20), t(203) ¼
4.08, p < .001, while no other mean differed from the cor-
responding control condition t(203) < 1.30, p > .20.
Discussion
As expected, military aggression was perceived as less
illegitimate when the aggressor country was democratic and
the victim country nondemocratic, but only when the demo-
cratic population was perceived as providing support for
attacking a nondemocratic country. When the democratic pop-
ulation was perceived to be opposed to the aggressive policy of
their government, military intervention was perceived as illegi-
timate as in the other conditions.
One could have expected the democracy-as-value
hypothesis to predict a greater perceived popular support for
democratic countries in general; however, we did not find
evidence for such an effect. Indeed, such an understanding
of the causal relationship between political structure and
public opinion (which is open to debate in political science,
e.g., Brooks & Manza, 2007; Page & Saphiro, 1983) is chal-
lenged by the fact that dissent and public disagreement with
authorities not only is more tolerated in democracies than in
nondemocracies but also constitutes the cornerstone of
democracy.
In order to provide a more clear-cut test of the moderating
role of popular support, in Experiment 2 we sought to repli-
cate the above findings while experimentally manipulating
popular support for the military intervention. We
also sought a replication with a sample of army recruits
which would supposedly be less prone to consider military
interventions as illegitimate when compared to undergradu-
ate students.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants and Procedure. Participants, all Swiss men, were
recruited during their military service in training camps in
Switzerland. Since military issues are a daily concern in the
army, the question of the legitimacy of a military intervention
should be of particular relevance for such a sample. A total of
179 participants, with ages ranging from 18 to 22 (M ¼ 19.57,
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Figure 1. Perceived legitimacy of the military intervention as a func-
tion of the political structure of aggressor and victim countries and
perceived popular support (+1 SD; Experiment 1).
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SD ¼ 0.93), were again retained on the basis that they declared
to know little or nothing about the conflict.
Procedure and materials were identical to those of Experi-
ment 1. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
eight experimental conditions following a 2 (Victim Coun-
try: democratic, nondemocratic)  2 (Aggressor Country:
democratic, nondemocratic)  2 (Popular Support: low,
high) design. The main dependent variable was again the
perceived legitimacy of the military intervention (a ¼ .86;
M ¼ 1.96, SD ¼ 1.97).
Popular Support for the Military Intervention. This time, parti-
cipants were also informed that opinion polls indicated that
90% of Abazia’s population were either in agreement with
their aggressive government policy (high support condition)
or in disagreement with it (low support condition). In order
to check this manipulation, participants at the end of the study
were asked the same question as in Experiment 1 (M ¼ 4.38,
SD ¼ 3.68).
Results
All analyses were run using a 2 (Victim Country: democratic,
nondemocratic)  2 (Aggressor Country: democratic, nonde-
mocratic)  2 (Popular Support: low, high) ANOVA.
Manipulation Checks
Again, the aggressor country, M ¼ 3.81, SD ¼ 2.83; intercor-
relations between the 2 constitutive items, r(169) ¼ .29,
p < .001, was overall perceived as less democratic than the vic-
tim country, M ¼ 5.00, SD ¼ 3.02; r(168) ¼ .54, p < .001;
t(174) ¼ 3.15, p ¼ .002. Again, the aggressor country was
perceived as more democratic in the democratic condition
(M ¼ 4.96, SD ¼ 2.86) than in the nondemocratic condition
(M ¼ 2.61, SD ¼ 2.24), F(1, 168) ¼ 42.36, p < .001, Zp2 ¼
.20. And again, the victim country was perceived as more dem-
ocratic in the democratic condition (M¼ 6.75, SD¼ 2.40) than
in the nondemocratic condition (M ¼ 3.12, SD ¼ 2.44), F(1,
168) ¼ 101.91, p < .001, Zp2 ¼ .37. Furthermore, perceived
support was higher in the high-support condition (M ¼ 6.56,
SD ¼ 3.10) than in the low-support condition (M ¼ 2.02, SD
¼ 2.69), F(1, 171) ¼ 105.94, p < .0001, Zp2 ¼ .38. It is worth
noting that none of the popular support main and interaction
effects influenced the perceived level of democracy of both
victim and aggressor countries, F(1, 171) < 2.17. Finally, as
in Experiment 1, political structure did not influence perceived
popular support, F(1, 171) < 1.92.
Perceived Legitimacy of the Military Intervention
As in Experiment 1, the predicted 3-way interaction was signif-
icant, F(1, 171) ¼ 4.13, p ¼ .044, Zp2 ¼ .024 (see Figure 2).
Perceived legitimacy was highest in the condition in which the
aggressor country was democratic and the population sup-
ported the intervention against a nondemocratic victim country
(M¼ 2.81). Planned comparisons confirmed that this condition
differed significantly from the seven other combined condi-
tions, t(171) ¼ 2.30, p ¼ .022. However, analyses of residuals
showed that one other condition differed from the others;
perceived legitimacy was lower when the victim country was
democratic, the aggressor country nondemocratic, and the pop-
ulation did not support the military intervention (M ¼ 0.85),
t(171) ¼ 12.03, p < .001.
Discussion
Again, results confirmed that the military intervention was
perceived as less illegitimate when planned by a democratic
country against a nondemocratic country and supported by the
Figure 2.Means for perceived legitimacy of the military intervention as a function of the political structure of aggressor and victim countries and
manipulated popular support (Experiment 2).
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population of the democratic aggressor country. The present
experiment thus replicated the findings of Experiment 1 with
a sample of male army recruits, while experimentally manip-
ulating popular support for the country’s intention to use mil-
itary force.
The results of this experiment also revealed an unexpected
finding. Military intervention was perceived as the most illegi-
timate when it was planned against a democratic country by a
nondemocratic country that did not receive the support of its
citizens toward its military policy. This unexpected finding can
be explained by our theoretical argument, since it constitutes
the corollary of our main hypothesis: this condition indeed
cumulated the lowest level of legitimacy expected across the
three experimental factors.
General Discussion
The present research provided evidence for the democracy-as-
value hypothesis. Across two experiments and two different
samples, with measured and manipulated popular support, parti-
cipants considered military intervention as less illegitimate when
a democratic country was supported by its citizenry for attacking
a nondemocratic one. Of particular relevance, the present
research introduced two important elements that allowed us to
perform a direct test of the democracy-as-value hypothesis.
First, the fact that the participants’ country was not involved
in the conflict allowed us to examine the value associated with
democracy independently of instrumental motives such as
favoring one’s own or allied countries. Accordingly, the use
of such a third-party perspective provides a more powerful
illustration of the ideological nature of the use of democracy
in condoning armed interventions (see also Falomir et al.,
2005). Second, the present research recognized the importance
of public opinion as social proof of democratic legitimacy. On
one hand, the present research showed that democracies are not
associated with greater public support. This finding suggests
that two conflicting perceptions may be working at the same
time: Whereas popular support may constitute an inherent
determinant of democracies, perceivers also associate them
with tolerance for dissent and support toward peaceful solu-
tions. However, on the other hand, this present research showed
that once public support is granted, democratic public support
provides more legitimacy to government policies than nondemo-
cratic public support. Accordingly, democracy-as-value stems
not only from the legitimacy provided by democratic govern-
ments but also from the legitimacy granted by a consenting pub-
lic sphere.
Limitations and Future Research
The present two experiments, while providing converging evi-
dence for the democracy-as-value hypothesis, also open up
avenues for further research. First, in the present research we
inferred the value of democracy from the perceived legitimacy
of war intentions. However, further research may introduce
measures of the perceived value of democracy in order to study
its mediating role in the effect of experimentally induced fac-
tors (e.g., country regimes and public opinion) on the perceived
legitimacy of outcome variables. Second, future research
should additionally explore whether the perceived legitimacy
of military interventions actually mediates the effect of politi-
cal regime and public opinion on the actual support for aggres-
sion. Finally, further research would be helpful in order to
examine the effect of the participants’ level of involvement
in a conflict that may gradually increase as the enemy persists
in their attacks (Healy et al., 2002).
Another important issue to consider is whether the present
findings can be understood more simply as a consequence of
in-group favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). We do not think
that democracy-as-value hypothesis simply means that our
participants protect democratic ‘‘in-groups’’ as compared to
nondemocratic ‘‘out-groups,’’ and at least three considerations
support our reasoning. First, historical evidence on the spread
of democratic institutions and the more recent events in North
Africa and the Middle East suggest that democratic ideals of
public participation are not necessarily restricted to Western
countries, but that they may rather constitute universal refer-
ence values (e.g., Dunn, 2005; Sen, 1999; Shapiro, 2003). The
second consideration refers to the fact that moral judgments
and convictions are experienced as facts that transcend bound-
aries of people, groups, and cultures (Skitka, 2002; Wenzel,
2000). Third, the present results show that the effects of
democracy-as-value emerged even though there was no way
for the participants to self-identify with an unfamiliar country.
However, this does not mean that the present pattern of find-
ings would necessarily be replicated in any other country,
since specific cultural, social, and political contexts may
reduce or on the contrary enhance the perception of democ-
racy as a value. Future research could examine whether
democracy actually constitutes a universal reference value
that may influence observers’ perceptions even in allegedly
nondemocratic contexts.
Finally, contributions to the present line of research may
also come from articulations with theoretical alternative
approaches that may appear at odds with the reported results.
For example, the expectancy-violation theory (e.g., Jussim,
Coleman, & Lerch, 1987) states that we evaluate people more
extremely when their behavior violates the stereotyped expec-
tancies derived from their in-group. Since the expectation of a
peaceful behavior is higher for states of democratic countries
than for nondemocratic countries (e.g., Rummel, 1997), one
could have expected people to evaluate military interventions
more unfavorably specially when a democratic country has the
support of its population. Further research is therefore needed
in order to model under what circumstances legitimacy judg-
ments will follow principles of either expectancy-violation or
democratic righteousness.
Relevance to Philosophy and Political Science
In conclusion, we think that the present findings may have
implications for the democratic peace theory. This theory,
Falomir-Pichastor et al. 329
 at Universite de Geneve on April 4, 2012spp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
originally rooted in Kant’s thesis about perpetual peace (Kant,
1795/1970), may be summarized by the hypothesis that demo-
cratic nation-states do not fight each other. Although this
hypothesis has received substantial empirical support in inter-
national conflict analyses (e.g., Cederman, 2001; Doyle,
1996; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Reiter & Stam, 2002; Rummel,
1997), two major explanations for the democratic peace effect
have been proposed (Maoz & Russett, 1993). The first is struc-
tural and posits that the complexity of democratic procedures
and institutions (e.g., different powers, opposition parties, pub-
lic opinion, elections) makes political leaders wary of any
unreasonable and ‘‘costly’’ use of force. The second explana-
tion is normative and emphasizes the influence of intrinsically
peaceful ideologies and values that promote diplomatic and
negotiated solutions over conflict. This does not mean that
democracies are overall less war prone (since they are not,
e.g., Kolb, 2003; Reiter & Stam, 2002) but rather suggests that
democratic societies perceive each other as legitimate, and that
fighting each other is therefore more illegitimate than fighting a
nondemocratic country (see Friedman, 2008).
By providing experimental support for a normative-moral
explanation of democratic peace theory, the present findings
suggest that a lay version of this theory may also be found at
the level of national populations and the ways they consider
democracy. Beyond the overarching conviction that attacking
another country is fundamentally un-democratic, the intrinsic
value provided by democracy has the potential to moderate
people’s perceived legitimacy of military interventions.
Indeed, the present results suggest that people subscribe to a lay
version of the democratic peace theory, which may paradoxi-
cally lead them to condemn aggression among democratic
nations, whilst condoning the aggressions of democratic
nations against nondemocratic nations.
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Note
1. Given that scores were not normally distributed in both Experiment
1 (Skewness ratio¼ 1.04, SE¼ .18, Kurtosis ratio¼ .70, SE¼ .36)
and Experiment 2 (Skewness ratio¼ 1.48, SE ¼ .16; Kurtosis
ratio ¼ 1.82, SE ¼ .33), the same analyses were run on a logarith-
mic transformation of this measure. Results were similar, and the
predicted 3-way interaction remained significant for both
experiments, F(1, 165) ¼ 9.13, p ¼ .003, Zp2 ¼ .05, and F(1,
171) ¼ 4.40, p ¼ .037, Zp2 ¼ .02, respectively.
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